The foundations of Godwinian impartiality by Lamb, Robert




William Godwin is often cited in contemporary philosophical discussions of ethical
impartiality, within which he functions as a sort of shorthand for a particularly crude
and extreme act-utilitarianism, one that contains no foundational commitments other
than the maximizing of some conception of the general good. This article offers a
reinterpretation of Godwin’s argument, by focusing closely on the ambiguous nature
of its justificatory foundations. Although utilitarian political theories seem to have two
possible justifications available to them – egalitarian and teleological – there has been
little effort to establish which one of them Godwin’s argument for impartiality relies on.
This problem becomes more complicated when it is acknowledged that Godwin actually
provides two different justifications for impartiality, only one of which is consequentialist.
The other seems to make a case based on the recognition of moral worth and virtue. This
is something confirmed through analysis of Godwin’s writings on equality and suggests
his political theory is more complex than most philosophers are willing to admit.
It is perhaps surprising that the radical philosopher William Godwin,
whose popularity peaked and dwindled in the very last years of
the eighteenth century, is regularly cited in current philosophical
discussions about ethical impartiality. Within these discussions,
Godwin usually functions as a sort of shorthand for a particularly
extreme and crude form of act-utilitarianism, one that seems to have no
foundational principles other than a commitment to maximizing some
conception of the general good. The purpose of this article is to offer a
reinterpretation of Godwin’s argument for impartiality – contained in
his ‘famous fire cause’ – by focusing closely on the ambiguous nature of
its justificatory foundations.
Utilitarian political theories can be justified in two different ways:
on the one hand, they can emerge from a foundational commitment
to ‘equal consideration of interests’; and on the other, they can be
teleological or perfectionist. My contention is that in his defence
of impartiality, Godwin invokes both of these justifications for his
utilitarian argument, but that it is remarkably unclear which one
has the key justificatory role. Though both egalitarian and teleological
interpretations of his argument seem initially plausible, both have
problems. Moreover, what seems like a straightforward conflict between
two rival utilitarian justifications becomes more complicated once it is
recognized that Godwin actually gives two different reasons for acting
impartially. Only one of these reasons is clearly utilitarian. The other
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has markedly different roots and seems to make the case for recognizing
moral worth or virtue on non-consequentialist grounds.
This almost universally ignored aspect of Godwin’s utilitarianism
has a dual significance. On the one hand, his argument for impartiality
parallels that advanced by John Stuart Mill, perhaps indicating that
this issue of justificatory ambiguity has a wider resonance for utilitari-
anism as a whole. On the other, Godwin’s utilitarianism emerges as far
more complex than contemporary theorists are usually willing to admit,
adding further credence to Brian Barry’s observation that ‘to some
degree . . . the “Godwin” in philosophical currency is an invention’.1
I
There seem to be two possible justifications for any version of
utilitarianism. As Will Kymlicka notes, the first is a commitment to
‘equal consideration of interests’, encapsulated by the dictum, famously
attributed to Bentham by Mill, ‘everybody to count for one, nobody
for more than one’.2 This approach takes the view that the welfare
of each individual is of equal importance and that the best method
of recognizing this equality is to ensure that everyone gets an equal
standing in the utilitarian calculus. Therefore, according to this view,
‘the requirement that we maximize utility is entirely derived from the
prior requirement to treat people with equal consideration’.3
Kymlicka contrasts this egalitarian justification with the view
of utilitarianism as a ‘teleological’ doctrine. This teleological
interpretation, invoked by (among others) John Rawls, considers our
moral obligations to be concerned solely with the promotion of a
predefined good: ‘not with persons, but with states of affairs’.4 Thus,
an act (or rule) is deemed morally right if it promotes such a good.
In order to show that the two justifications cannot be coherently run
together, Kymlicka turns to Derek Parfit’s much-discussed argument
concerning the ethical issues raised by questions of human population.
The ‘Repugnant Conclusion’ Parfit reaches is:
For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high
quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose
1 Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford, 1995), p. 225, emphasis suppressed.
2 John Stuart Mill, ‘Utilitarianism’, Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. J. M.
Robson, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, x (Toronto, 1969), p. 257. For analysis of the
role that equality plays in Bentham’s political thought, see Frederick Rosen, Classical
Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill (London, 2003), chs. 12–13; Rosen, Jeremy Bentham
and Representative Democracy (Oxford, 1983), ch. 10; Gerald J. Postema, ‘Bentham’s
Equality-Sensitive Utilitarianism’, Utilitas 10 (1998); H. L. A. Hart ‘Natural Rights:
Bentham and John Stuart Mill’, in Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and
Political Theory (Oxford, 1982); David J. Crossley, ‘Utilitarianism, Rights and Equality’,
Utilitas 2 (1990).
3 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford, 1991),
p. 31, emphasis added.
4 Ibid., p. 32. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, 1999), pp. 19–24.
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existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though its members
have lives that are barely worth living.5
As Kymlicka points out, such an argument could not spring from a
commitment to ‘equality of interests’, because only the welfare of those
already alive would be considered relevant to any moral assessment.
Put bluntly, ‘non-existent people do not have moral claims—we do not
have a moral duty to bring them into the world.’6 It would seem, then,
that Parfit’s argument could be justified solely through reference to
a teleological account of utilitarianism, one that prioritizes a certain
vision of the good, such as ‘maximum quantity of overall happi-
ness experienced’. In order to satisfy this good, it would clearly be
preferable to increase population as much as is expedient, since what
matters is the total amount of happiness experienced and not who is
experiencing it or at what level.
The justificatory foundations of utilitarian arguments are not always
this clear-cut, as the case of John Stuart Mill illustrates. There is no
doubt that when pressed on the issue of egalitarian foundations, Mill
was quite explicit, suggesting that utilitarianism was
A mere form of words without rational signification, unless one person’s
happiness, supposed in equal degree (with proper allowance made for kind),
is counted for exactly as much as another’s. Those conditions being supplied,
Bentham’s dictum ‘everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one’, might
be written under the principle as an explanatory commentary.7
Directly confronting the charge of Herbert Spencer, that utilitarianism
is self-contradictory since it presupposes an equal ‘right’ to
happiness, Mill states that such an egalitarian commitment ‘is not a
presupposition; not a premise needful to support the principle of utility,
but the very principle itself’.8
Mill’s utilitarianism appears, then, to have the same egalitarian
foundation as Bentham’s. Yet, as Kymlicka notes, advocates of utilita-
rianism frequently advance arguments that rely on a ‘tacit mixing of
the two justifications’9 and this is a prominent issue in Mill’s political
thought. For example, The Subjection of Women contains an argument
for sexual equality, which, whilst seemingly relying on an egalitarian
foundation, often grasps for wider teleological justifications. Mill claims
that the unequal position of women in society is, on the one hand
‘wrong in itself ’ and, on the other, ‘one of the chief hindrances to human
5 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, 1984), p. 388.
6 Kymlicka, p. 32.
7 Mill, ‘Utilitarianism’, CW x. 257.
8 Ibid., p. 258.
9 Kymlicka, p. 35.
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improvement’.10 Whilst there is no necessary contradiction between the
two claims, as both could happen to be true, it would seem that only
one could provide a (non-question-begging) normative foundation. If
individuals are to be treated equally because equality is a fundamental
norm, then the human progress that accompanies it is of secondary
importance, whilst if it is human progress that ultimately matters, the
equality necessary for it is of merely instrumental value.
This justificatory problem becomes particularly acute when
examining the classical utilitarian defence of ethical impartiality.
Whereas Bentham’s commitment to impartiality is logically entailed
by his idea of equality, Mill’s writings on the issue are far more
ambiguous. Indeed, it is unclear whether or not it is ultimately
justified as a corollary of a foundational egalitarianism or by a wider
teleological ethic. For instance, in chapter 5 of Utilitarianism, he
describes impartiality as the ‘first of judicial virtues’, a ‘necessary
condition of the fulfilment of the other obligations of justice’.11 However,
he also states that acting impartially ‘does not seem to be regarded as
a duty in itself, but rather as instrumental to some other duty’.12 The
question this begs is clear: is the impartial treatment of individuals a
foundational component of Mill’s utilitarianism (as it is for Bentham),
or is it only important for ‘instrumental’ utilitarian reasons? This
problem is not unique to Mill and is prominent in the most notorious
utilitarian account of impartiality: that offered by William Godwin.
II
The most widely discussed aspect of William Godwin’s utilitarianism13
is its extreme nature,14 which is most evident in his argument for
10 Mill, ‘The Subjection of Women’, Essays on Equality, Law, and Education, ed. J. M.
Robson, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, xxi (Toronto, 1984), p. 261.
11 Mill, ‘Utilitarianism’, CW x. 257, emphasis added.
12 Ibid., p. 243.
13 I am obviously working on the assumption that Godwin is best described as
a utilitarian thinker, which is a somewhat contentious claim. Traditional accounts
of the growth of utilitarian thought (e.g. Leslie Stephen, The English Utilitarians
(London, 1900); Elie´ Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism (London, 1952);
John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford, 1958)) and more recent accounts of
Godwin’s thought (e.g. John P. Clark, The Philosophical Anarchism of William Godwin,
(Princeton, 1977); Don Locke, A Fantasy of Reason: The Life and Thought of William
Godwin (London, 1980); Peter H. Marshall, William Godwin (London, 1984)) do consider
his ethical scheme to be utilitarian. This has, however, been disputed. Mark Philp argues
in Godwin’s Political Justice (Ithaca, 1986) that Godwin’s political thought is better
described as ‘perfectionist’ (see esp. ch. 4) – though he does concede that the label
utilitarian becomes appropriate as early as the second edition of Political Justice in
1795 (p. 157). Philp’s argument is largely predicated on the controversial claim that
utilitarianism cannot ‘provide an account of the moral position which Godwin believed
he was advancing’ because his ‘version is just too sophisticated for this period’ (p. 84).
14 The fact that Shelly Kagan – who suggests that it is morally reprehensible to attend
the cinema when one could be more effectively contributing to the greater good – cites
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impartiality, advanced through consideration of a notorious ethical
dilemma, subsequently dubbed the ‘famous fire cause’. It originally
appeared in his controversial Enquiry Concerning Political Justice,
first published in 1793. Godwin altered some of the minor details of the
dilemma in two subsequent editions of the text – in 1795 and 1797 –
but his argument remained the same in each. Indeed, though scholars
often place emphasis on the later modifications of his views, Godwin
never substantially altered the basic thrust of his argument.15
In his infamous scenario, two individuals are trapped together inside
a burning building with only enough time to rescue one. The two
people in question are the seventeenth-century French philosopher
Archbishop Fe´nelon and his valet.16 Godwin argues that justice
demands the rescue of Fe´nelon at the expense of the valet, on the
grounds that
That life ought to be preferred which will be most conducive to the general
good. In saving the life of Fe´nelon, suppose at the moment he conceived the
project of his immortal Telemachus, I should have been promoting the benefit of
thousands who have been cured by the perusal of that work of some error, vice
and consequent unhappiness. Nay, my benefit would extend further than this;
for every individual, thus cured, has become a better member of society, and
has contributed in his turn to the happiness, information and improvement of
others. Suppose I had been myself the valet; I ought to have chosen to die, rather
than Fe´nelon should have died. . . . Suppose the valet had been my brother, my
father or my benefactor. This would not alter the truth of the proposition . . .
Godwin as an ‘extremist’ is telling in this respect: Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford,
1989), pp. 1–2, 10.
15 It is often implied (see, for example, Locke, ch. 16) that following the death of his wife
Mary Wollstonecraft and intense criticism from both enemies and former friends, Godwin
recanted his commitment to impartiality and rejected his argument in the ‘famous fire
cause’. Certainly, he did bemoan his inattention to the importance of feeling, in both his
Memoirs of Wollstonecraft (1798) and the preface to his novel St. Leon (1799). He even
composed a ‘memorandum’, intended to be the first part of a book on ‘first principles’
of morality, that suggested high regard for partial, ‘domestic affections’. Peter Singer,
Leslie Cannold, and Helga Kuhse have regarded such revisions as leaving only a ‘muted
impartialism’ (‘William Godwin and the Defense of Impartialist Ethics’, Utilitas 7 (1995),
p. 85). However, the lengthy treatment of the subject in Godwin’s ‘Thoughts Occasioned
by the Perusal of Dr. Parr’s Spital Sermon . . .’ (Uncollected Writings by William Godwin
(1785–1822), ed. Jack. W. Marken and Burton R. Pollin (Gainsville, Fl., 1968) hereafter
referred to as ‘Reply to Parr’), published in 1801, suggests otherwise. Herein, although
Godwin reprints the extracts from both the Memoirs and St. Leon, and continues to laud
domestic affections, his central arguments retain a robust utilitarian commitment to
impartiality. ‘Parental and filial affection’ are important as they enable individuals to
cultivate a virtuous personality and because there is simply more chance of generating
utility through interactions with those in close proximity (pp. 316–17). Tellingly, he
concludes that affective ties ‘are liable to excess’ and must have ‘rigorous limits assigned’:
‘I must take care not so to love, or so to obey my love to my parent or child, as to intrench
upon an important and paramount public good’ (p. 321).
16 Or his chambermaid, depending on which edition of Political Justice is consulted.
The gender of the individual in question changes over the course of the three editions and
alternative explanations for these changes have been advanced. A rundown of scholarly
speculation on the matter can be found in Singer et al., ‘William Godwin’, p. 71.
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justice, pure unadulterated justice, would still have preferred that which was
most valuable.17
So, in such situations, we ought to rescue the individual who will do
most for the ‘general good’ and this is the case even if it entails the
sacrifice of either our own life or that of our nearest and dearest.
Anticipating the obvious objection that one should save the valet
simply because he is my parent, Godwin asks
What magic is there in the pronoun ‘my’, that should justify us in overturning
the decisions of impartial truth? My brother or my father may be a fool or a
profligate, malicious, lying or dishonest. If they be, of what consequence is it
that they are mine?18
Upon first reading, the meaning of these passages seems quite clear:
Godwin apparently suggests that in such a perilous situation, justice
requires affective relationships to be ignored for the sake of the overall
good. For all that matters when morally evaluating this action are
the consequences of the agent’s actions.19 It is therefore proper to
rescue somebody who will contribute to the ‘happiness, information
and improvement of others’ rather than a ‘fool or a profligate’. Yet,
the consequences of Godwin’s argument are even more far-reaching
than the sacrifice of a ‘bad’ parent; indeed, one’s parent could be an
affable, well-meaning sort, yet such factors would still be irrelevant
if they were of little social ‘worth’ when compared to Fe´nelon. It is
unsurprising then that Godwin stands accused of advancing a ruthless
form of act-utilitarianism, whereby each act is considered just, purely
to the extent that it generates utility.20
In the following passages, Godwin goes on to consider (and reject)
several arguments for alternative courses of action. He assesses the
claim that an individual should rescue their parent, because of a debt
17 William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Morals
and Happiness, ed. F. E. L. Priestly (Toronto, 1946), vol. 1, pp. 127–8.
18 Ibid., p. 128.
19 In Political Justice, Godwin does attach importance to individual motivations,
defining a virtuous action as ‘any action . . . of an intelligent being proceeding from
kind and benevolent intention and having a tendency to contribute to general happiness’
(p. 149). However, in the ‘Reply to Parr’ he makes clear that, although important, inten-
tions cannot be the ‘criterion’ of virtue: ‘when we proceed to ascertain whether our actions
are entitled to the name of virtue, this can only be done by examining into their effects,
by bringing them to a standard, and comparing them with a criterion’, which is ‘utility’
(pp. 318–19).
20 Indeed, it is undoubtedly because of this interpretation that Godwin remains so often
invoked in contemporary discussions of impartiality. As Don Locke notes, the ‘famous fire
cause’ ‘is just the sort of example often invoked as providing an exception to, perhaps
even a refutation of utilitarian principles’ (p. 173). Or as Brian Barry puts it ‘for anti-
utilitarians, if Godwin had not existed he would have to have been invented’ (Justice as
Impartiality, p. 225).
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owed for assistance ‘in the helplessness of infancy’.21 Godwin’s response
is that this is mere gratitude and is therefore ‘no part of either justice
or virtue’.22 This is because gratitude is retrospective, as Godwin sees
it, ‘a sentiment of preference which I entertain towards another, upon
the grounds of my having been the subject of his benefits’.23 But what
if an individual is unaware of Fe´nelon’s value to society yet has ample
evidence of the talents and potential of his kin? Godwin’s answer to
this is that it is a mere excuse, explained by ‘the imperfection of human
nature’: ‘it may serve as an apology for my error’, he writes, ‘but can
never change error into truth’.24
III
Godwin’s utilitarianism thus seems unflinchingly consequentialist and
is almost universally presented in such terms. For example, Marcia
Baron concludes that
Godwin’s extreme views . . . turn out to be based not primarily on a conception of
impartiality or on moral notions which motivate it, such as fairness or equality.
They are based, rather, on his belief that we have a duty to do everything
possible to promote the general weal – together with a rather crude notion of
just what it is to do so.25
Baron’s view would clearly place Godwin amongst those who defend
utilitarianism on teleological grounds. Rescuing Fe´nelon would
contribute more to the ‘general weal’ than rescuing one’s mother, father
or whomever, and thus it is the morally right action. Also in the quoted
passage, Baron unequivocally states that Godwin’s arguments have no
egalitarian basis.
There is certainly plenty of additional evidence throughout Political
Justice in support of Baron’s interpretation and Godwin frequently uses
what appears to be a very blunt form of consequentialist reasoning. For
example, turning his attention to property rights, he claims that an
individual can have no legitimate ownership over goods that could
be more beneficially utilized by another. Thus, if ‘my neighbour is
in want of ten pounds that I can spare . . . unless it can be shown
that the money can be more beneficially employed, his right is as
complete . . . as if he had my bond in his possession, or had supplied
me with goods to the amount’.26 He has a similar attitude towards
21 Godwin, Political Justice, vol. 1, p. 128.
22 Ibid., p. 129.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 130.
25 Marcia Baron, ‘Impartiality and Friendship’, Ethics 101.4 (1991), p. 842, emphasis
added.
26 Godwin, Political Justice, vol. 1, p. 135.
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suicide. Whilst he doubts that such an act could ever benefit society,
he suggests that ‘in common with every branch of morality, it is
a topic of calculation, as to the balance of good and evil to result
from its employment in any individual instance’.27 Even the crucial
commitment to sincerity that runs throughout his political thought
appears to have a consequentialist justification. Thus the only reason
for keeping promises is that doing so ‘tends to the welfare of intelligent
beings’,28 for any ‘obligation of sincerity’, he contends, is dependent
on ‘the indefeasible benefit annexed to its observance’.29 These
arguments, along with his declaration that ‘the criterion of justice is
the influence my conduct will have on the stock of the general good’,30
seem to vindicate Baron’s teleological interpretation of Godwin’s
argument.
Although this vision of Godwin as a strict act-utilitarian is a familiar
one – and despite the evidence in support of such a vision – there are
problems with Baron’s analysis. Her argument, that Godwin’s defence
of impartiality has no moral commitments prior to maximizing the
general good, only holds if it is accepted that all Godwin is interested
in is the maximization of happiness in the Parfitian, teleological sense
discussed earlier (which is what Baron must mean by ‘general weal’).
Yet there is significant evidence to suggest that Godwin values more
than merely the maximization of overall happiness for its own sake,
which, in turn, suggests that his defence of impartiality stems from a
foundational principle that is not teleological.
Indeed, Godwin’s commitment to impartiality can be interpreted
as deriving from the fundamental commitment to equality that
often grounds utilitarian arguments. Such a claim seems admittedly
problematic when considering the ‘famous fire cause’, because it
appears to be a striking example of unequal treatment. It seems
quite strange, perhaps even contradictory, to consider an argument for
preserving one individual at the expense of another as emerging from
a basic commitment to equality. However, despite the obvious disparity
in outcomes, the process can still be regarded as a fundamentally
egalitarian one. This is because the traditional, Benthamite utilitarian
conception of equality is quite consistent with Godwin’s argument for
preserving Fe´nelon. As noted earlier, for Bentham, the equal treatment
of individuals entails the equal counting of their individual happiness
27 Ibid., p. 138.
28 Ibid., p. 195.
29 Ibid., p. 212.
30 Ibid., p. 197.
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in the utilitarian calculus.31 This connection of equal treatment
and utilitarian calculation has also been invoked by Sidgwick and
Peter Singer.32 Godwin’s defence of impartiality can accordingly
be regarded as thoroughly egalitarian, since his approach counts
each individual’s (idealized) happiness equally, before reaching the
conclusion that rescuing Fe´nelon is the morally correct action. Such
an interpretation is endorsed by Brian Barry, who argues that Godwin
moves ‘quite explicitly’ from ‘the claim that impartiality requires the
equal consideration of interests to the conclusion that impartiality
entails the summation of interests’.33
This reading, that is, one that demonstrates that Godwin does care
about equality – and further, that this manifests itself in the ‘famous
fire cause’ – would seem to undermine Baron’s analysis. But this
is still not the whole story. What emerges from careful analysis of
the entire chapter that details the scenario, ‘Of Justice’, is Godwin’s
commitment to a more complex justification than is traditionally
supposed. Indeed, when justifying the preservation of Fe´nelon at the
expense of a loved one, Godwin offers two ‘grounds of preference’.
Furthermore, although both grounds are reliant on fundamental
egalitarian commitments, these commitments appear to embody two
different, indeed conflicting, notions of equality. Establishing whether
or not the two rival conceptions of equality can form a coherent
argument, or which of the two has a primary justificatory role, depends
on interpreting some ambiguous aspects of the text.
IV
The argument for keeping Fe´nelon alive is not presented by Godwin
himself in the straightforwardly consequentialist terms employed by
subsequent commentators. His claim that the ‘life ought to be preferred
which will be most conducive to the general good’ is actually introduced
as a second reason for preserving Fe´nelon – indeed as ‘another ground of
31 This interpretation of Bentham’s political theory has been recently challenged by
Rosen, who claims that it demands not aggregative happiness but ‘the provision of an
equal quantity of happiness to all concerned’ (Classical Utilitarianism, p. 229).
32 In his introduction to Practical Ethics (Oxford, 1979), Singer writes: ‘Imagine that
I am trying to decide between two possible courses of action . . . . Suppose I then begin
to think ethically, to the extent of recognizing that my own interests cannot count for
more, simply because they are my own, than the interests of others. In place of my own
interests, I now have to take account of the interests of all those affected by my decision.
This requires me to weigh up all these interests and adopt the course of action most likely
to maximize the interests of those affected. Thus I must choose the course of action which
has the best consequences, on balance, for all affected. This is a form of utilitarianism’
(p. 12). Cf. Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics (London, 1907).
33 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 225.
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preference’.34 Prior to championing the consequentialist case in favour
of rescuing the archbishop, Godwin offers a different argument.
The chapter ‘Of Justice’ begins with Godwin defining justice as
the ‘impartial treatment of every man in matters that relate to
his happiness’.35 He then considers practical applications of this
principle, first assessing the classic Christian maxim ‘that we should
love our neighbour as ourselves’. He argues that despite ‘possessing
considerable merit as a popular principle’, such a moral rule must
ultimately be rejected, on the grounds that ‘it is not modelled with the
strictness of philosophical accuracy’.36 This is a strangely phrased and
revealing response. A typical utilitarian assessment of moral rules such
as ‘love thy neighbour as yourself ’ would stress their contingency: they
may be important moral strictures if it can be established that they
generate overall utility. Their adoption as moral rules depends upon
this and they should not be regarded as holding any intrinsic value.
Given his rejection of moral practices such as gratitude and promise-
keeping on consequentialist grounds, this would seem to be the line of
argument that we would expect Godwin to offer with regard to ‘love
thy neighbour’. Indeed, he does gesture towards this type of response
by acknowledging the ‘merit’ of this particular moral rule as a ‘popular
principle’. The implication is that we should love our neighbours as
ourselves for as long as this practice is conducive to the general good.
However, the reason that Godwin actually provides to further explain
the ‘philosophical inaccuracy’ of this principle is far removed from this
(or any) standard utilitarian objection.
Godwin rejects the ‘love thy neighbour as ourselves’ command on the
following grounds:
In a loose and very general view I and my neighbour are both of us men; and of
consequence entitled to equal attention. But in reality, it is probable that one
of us is a being of more worth and importance than the other.37
So, we should not love our neighbours as much as ourselves, as this
would ignore a differential in our respective ‘worth and importance’.
He then explains the way in which ‘worth’ is to be measured: ‘A
man is worth more than a beast; because, being possessed of higher
faculties, he is capable of a more refined and genuine happiness.’38 An
34 Godwin, Political Justice, vol. 1, p. 127.
35 Ibid., p. 126. The basis of this equality is Godwin’s claim that humans are ‘partakers
of a common nature’ (p. 146). However, he also suggests that ‘justice has relation to beings
endowed with perception, and capable of pleasure and pain’ (p. 146), which would seem
to extend the boundaries of his moral universe to include (at least some) non-human
animals. Indeed, his only reason for declaring that ‘a man is of more worth than a beast’
is that ‘he is capable of a more refined and genuine happiness’ (p. 126).
36 Ibid., p. 126.
37 Ibid., p. 126, emphasis added.
38 Ibid.
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agent’s worth is, then, measured by their capacity for experiencing a
qualitatively superior level of happiness. It is on this basis that Godwin
then concludes that:
In the same manner the illustrious archbishop of Cambray was of more worth
and importance than his valet, and there are few of us that would hesitate to
pronounce, if his palace were in flames, and the life of only one of them could
be preserved, which of the two ought to be preferred.39
So this first ‘ground of preference’ is that Fe´nelon is ‘of more worth and
importance’, as he is capable of ‘a more refined and genuine happiness’
than his valet.
On the face of it, the recognition of an individual’s worth seems
entirely consistent with Godwin’s consequentialist reasoning. Clearly
one could argue that rescuing the most worthy individual is the right
thing to do because it would have desirable consequences. Such an
argument could run along a number of different lines. Fe´nelon could
be of ‘more worth and importance’ because he will contribute more to
the happiness of the rest of the population. Alternatively, it could be
argued, simply using Godwin’s definition of ‘worth’, that Fe´nelon should
be saved because he is capable of experiencing a qualitatively higher
happiness, which will, in turn, increase total utility.
There is, however, a compelling reason to resist these conse-
quentialist interpretations of this, first, worth-based argument.
Crucially, Godwin is about to introduce the consequentialist case for
rescuing Fe´nelon as ‘another ground of preference’, for consideration
‘beside the private consideration of one of them being further removed
from the state of a mere animal’.40 Thus, if we take Godwin literally –
and there is no reason not to – we must then accept that there
are two distinct grounds upon which he is defending the rescue of
Fe´nelon in favour of a less worthy individual. The second ground
of preference, whether justified on an egalitarian or a teleological
basis, is undoubtedly consequentialist. The first ground of preference
thus cannot be – or at least, if it were, it would make absolutely
no sense for him to draw such a clear distinction between different
grounds of preference. It is therefore necessary to establish what
possible non-consequentialist reason Godwin has to value the ‘worth
and importance’ of Fe´nelon.
V
The nature of Godwin’s first ground of preference can be explained
by shifting the interpretive focus onto his very specific definition
39 Ibid., pp. 126–7.
40 Ibid., p. 127, emphasis added.
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of equality, which is elucidated in the following chapter of Political
Justice, ‘Of the Equality of Mankind’. Herein, Godwin makes it plain
from the outset that, ‘the principles of justice, as explained in the
preceding chapter, proceed upon the assumption of the equality of
mankind’.41 This declaration clearly demonstrates the egalitarian roots
of all his previous arguments concerning justice, including the ‘famous
fire cause’.
The chapter begins with Godwin following Rousseau’s differentiation
of two types of potential inequality: ‘physical’ and ‘moral’.42 Though
adamant that the basis of neither inequality is natural or perennial,
Godwin does go on to defend ‘one species of inequality’. This ‘species’
is the belief that ‘the treatment to which men are entitled is to be
measured by their merits and their virtues’.43 Godwin then defends this
inequality, that of rewarding meritorious or virtuous individuals, on two
different grounds. First, there is a typical consequentialist justification,
which claims that, ‘that country would not be the seat of wisdom and
reason where the benefactor of his species was regarded with no greater
degree of complacence than their enemy’.44
However, Godwin’s second justification is egalitarian. He suggests
that the recognition of moral worth and the corresponding inequality
of treatment it involves, ‘In reality, so far from being adverse to
equality in any tenable sense, is friendly to it, and is accordingly
known by the appellation of equity, a term derived from the same
origin.’45 The recognition of virtuous actions is not, then, justified by
Godwin merely on consequentialist grounds, but rather because it is
part of what it means to treat individuals in a strictly equal manner.
If this is the case, and we accept his assertion that the demands of
justice ‘proceed upon’ the assumption of equality, it seems more than
reasonable to propose that this notion of reward plays a role in the
case for preserving Fe´nelon’s life. Evaluating an individual’s worth
is, by definition, a retrospective activity and when a consequentialist
justification is unavailable, individual virtue becomes valuable solely
for its own sake.
If Fe´nelon’s moral character is the reason for his rescue, and the
grounds are not consequentialist, then a principle of desert would seem
to be the only possible explanation. This interpretation is at first hard
41 Ibid., p. 143, emphasis added.
42 Ibid., J.-J. Rousseau, ‘A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality’, The Social Contract
and Discourses, ed. G. D. H. Cole (London, 1993) p. 49.
43 Godwin, Political Justice, vol. 1, p. 147.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid. This idea – that equality means the differential treatment of individuals
according to their merits or virtues – can be traced at least as far back as Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics, Book. V.
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to swallow because it seems to conflict with Godwin’s utilitarianism,
which is, as shown earlier, hostile to any retrospective moral evaluation
for non-consequentialist reasons.46 But it is consistent with Godwin’s
key claim that the recognition of individual merit or virtue (and
corresponding inequality of treatment) is part of the meaning of
equality and that justice ‘proceeds upon’ this equality. Curiously, within
her discussion of the ‘famous fire cause’, Marcia Baron recognizes
this ambiguity, but ignores any significant implications it might have
for determining the nature of Godwin’s argument. In a footnote, she
cautions that ‘his position is not as unambiguous as it may sound’
because ‘at times his view seems to be that we are obliged to help the
first needy and deserving person that comes our way’.47 In the very
next footnote, she admits ‘a tension in his theory between the claim
that we should optimize and the claim that we should reward those who
have optimized’, concluding that ‘while these need not be inconsistent,
some work is needed to show how they cohere, if, indeed, they do’.48
Presumably, Baron believes that it is possible for the ‘tension’ between
the two rival arguments to be resolved coherently because she believes
them to be grounded in the same justificatory principle. That she thinks
this is evident from her subsequent pronouncement that Godwin is only
interested in the ‘general weal’. At no point, however, does she mention
his separation of the two arguments as distinct ‘grounds of preference’,
which, as shown, indicates the presence of two separate justificatory
principles.
Baron’s assumption of justificatory coherence is, to an extent,
understandable, as later in the chapter Godwin does appear to run
the two arguments together, notably when listing the reasons for not
rescuing one’s parent. He argues that even if your parent has bestowed
a ‘voluntary benefit’ on you, this in itself is not enough to justify their
preservation:
I and another man cannot both be right in preferring our respective benefactors,
for my benefactor cannot be at the same time both better and worse than his
neighbour. My benefactor ought to be esteemed, not because he bestowed a
benefit upon me, but because he bestowed it on a human being.49
He then asserts that the benefactor’s ‘desert will be in exact proportion
to the degree in which that human being was worthy of the distinction
46 There clearly remains a utilitarian element to Godwin’s concept of desert. Though
the first ground of preference is a non-consequentialist recognition of Fe´nelon’s past
virtuous behaviour, it is his past maximization of utility (Godwin’s measure of virtue)
that makes him a deserving individual in the first place.
47 Baron, ‘Impartiality and Friendship’, p. 841, n. 14. The claim that Godwin believes
we are obliged to help the first ‘needy’ person who ‘comes our way’ seems unfounded.
48 Ibid., n. 15.
49 Godwin, Political Justice, vol. 1, p. 129.
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conferred’.50 Leaving aside the additional argument advanced – that
the worth of one individual depends on the worth of the recipient of
that individual’s voluntary benefit – it is not at all clear what Godwin
is now doing with ‘desert’. He seems here to be using it as a secondary
principle in a consequentialist scheme, as the following passage seems
to indicate. Considering the argument that rescuing our parents will
promote general utility, Godwin responds by asking
Is the general good promoted by falsehood, by treating a man of one degree of
worth as if he had ten times that worth? or as if he were in any degree different
from what he really is? Would not the most beneficial consequences result
from a different plan; from my constantly and carefully enquiring into the
deserts of all those with whom I am connected, and from their being sure, after
a certain allowance for the fallibility of human judgement, of being treated by
me exactly as they deserved? Who can describe the benefits that would result
from such a plan of conduct, if universally adopted?51
There is no doubt that in this passage Godwin justifies the recognition
of desert (and thus the preservation of Fe´nelon) on consequentialist
grounds. To complicate matters further, Godwin declares that, ‘Every
view of the subject brings us back to the consideration of my neighbour’s
moral worth, and his importance to the general weal, as the only
standard to determine the treatment to which he is entitled.’52 The
entire meaning of this seemingly pivotal passage, and perhaps the
whole of Godwin’s argument, hinges on how we are to interpret his use
of the word ‘and’. Is Godwin using ‘and’ to refer back to the two distinct
reasons originally advanced for rescuing Fe´nelon, on the one hand,
‘moral worth’, and on the other, ‘the general good’? Or does the ‘and’
perhaps signal that the two justifications are necessarily connected
in some way? That he originally introduced two ‘grounds of preference’
suggests an affirmative answer to the former question, with ‘and’ acting
to distinguish between them. Yet, in this passage he describes what
appear to be two different justifications as the ‘only standard’, confusing
matters even further.
If it is accepted that Godwin provides two distinct arguments
for preserving Fe´nelon – one based on rewarding him for virtuous
actions and the other for the benefits his existence will afford
society – there still remains the problem of justificatory primacy
within Godwin’s argument. The reason this problem arises is the
seemingly irreconcilable conflict between utilitarianism and a non-
consequentialist desert principle. What Fe´nelon has done in the past
is – from a utilitarian perspective – only contingently related to what
50 Ibid., emphasis added.
51 Ibid., pp. 130–1, emphasis added.
52 Ibid., p. 129, emphasis added.
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he will do in the future. The question that emerges, then, is what
matters most to Godwin: the principle of rewarding those who maximize
utility or the principle of maximizing utility? There seems no easy
way of reconciling these two contradictory principles and therefore no
straightforward solution to this apparent justificatory ambiguity. It is,
however, perhaps significant that this ambiguity is also present in Mill’s
account of impartiality in Utilitarianism. Mill notes that although
acting impartially has different meanings in different spheres, there
are several cases in which it means ‘being solely influenced by desert’.53
Furthermore, he describes the ‘duty to do to each according to his
deserts’, as ‘the highest abstract standard of social and distributive
justice; towards which all institutions, and the efforts of all virtuous
citizens, should be made in the utmost possible degree to converge’.54
Despite such views, Mill is keen to point out that this duty
rests upon a still deeper foundation, being a direct emanation from the
first principle of morals, and not a mere logical corollary from secondary or
derivative doctrines. It is involved in the very meaning of Utility, or the Greatest
Happiness Principle.55
Thus, desert seems ultimately to be nothing more than a ‘secondary
principle’ for Mill.56 But he fails to demonstrate exactly how the
moral requirement to recognize deserving individuals ‘emanates’ from
the utility principle. It is then immediately following this discussion
of impartiality and desert that Mill cites Bentham’s dictum as the
principle underpinning utilitarianism. The difficulty all of this raises
should be clear enough. Mill first suggests that impartiality sometimes
demands the recognition of individual desert claims. Then, he suggests
that as important as desert is, its justification is bound up in the ‘very
meaning of Utility’, which, in turn, has an egalitarian foundational
principle. But the conceptual relationship between ‘desert’, ‘utility’ and
‘equality’ is hardly a self-evident one and Mill’s reluctance to spell them
out arguably points to real tensions within his utilitarianism – tensions
that seem paralleled in Godwin’s account.
The appearance of moral worth in the specific context of the ‘famous
fire cause’ can perhaps be explained as a manifestation of Godwin’s
debt to the tradition of Rational Dissent, which played such a formative
role in his intellectual development. On such a reading, the choice to
53 Mill, ‘Utilitarianism’, CW x. 243. Mill distinguishes between cases that demand the
recognition of desert claims and those that demonstrate ‘consideration for the public
interest’ (p. 243).
54 Ibid., p. 257. Elsewhere in this chapter, Mill describes recognizing desert as ‘perhaps,
the clearest and most emphatic form in which the idea of justice is conceived by the
general mind’ (p. 242).
55 Ibid., p. 257.
56 Roger Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism (London, 1997), pp. 175–6.
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preserve the archbishop would be made by an all-knowing rational
deity concerned with issues other than mere consequences.57 It may
be highly significant, then, that Godwin stresses the need to ‘put
ourselves in the place of an impartial spectator, of an angelic nature . . .
beholding us from an elevated station’.58 Another possible explanation
lies, ironically, in the political writings of Fe´nelon himself. Fe´nelon’s
moral hierarchy prizes a form of action above all others: one in
which neither ‘fear of punishment’ nor ‘hope of reward’ provides any
motivation for the agent.59 Such an ideal befits Godwin’s contempt
for external interference and can perhaps explain how notions of moral
worth are embedded in the ‘famous fire cause’ and his account of human
equality.
VI
There remains a final problem raised by Godwin’s first, worth-
based ground of preference: how does it fit within his overall ethical
framework? The problem of coherence between Godwin’s argument for
rewarding virtue and the rest of his political thought emerges because
of the critical attitude he displays in Political Justice towards desert
as a moral principle: indeed, at one point arguing that ‘there is no
such thing as desert’.60 Despite his suggestion that the recognition of
merit and virtue is justifiable on both egalitarian and consequentialist
grounds, he quite explicitly rejects it as a basis for both distributive
and retributive justice. As far as the distributive sphere is concerned,
he notes that ‘it has sometimes been alleged, as an argument against
the equal rights of men . . . “that the merits of men are different, and
ought to be differently rewarded”’.61 He then suggests that although
this proposition is in some sense ‘true’, it should not be applied
to property.62 He provides a similarly uncompromising rejection of
57 I am grateful to Alan Ryan for this suggestion. For a detailed discussion of Godwin’s
debt to Rational Dissent, see Philp, ch. 1.
58 Godwin, Political Justice, vol. 1, p. 133 (emphasis added).
59 See Patrick Riley, ‘Rousseau, Fe´nelon, and the Quarrel between the Ancients and
the Moderns’, The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau, ed. Patrick Riley (Cambridge,
2001), p. 80.
60 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 327. This remark is made in the context of Godwin’s discussion of
punishment, in which he embraces hard determinism, notoriously pronouncing that ‘the
assassin cannot help the murder he commits, any more than the dagger’ since individuals
are ‘propelled to act by necessary causes and irresistible motives’ (p. 324).
61 Godwin, Political Justice, vol. 2, pp. 428–9.
62 Ibid. Godwin is unequivocal on this point: ‘ “If you show yourself deserving, you shall
have the essence of a hundred times more food than you can eat, and a hundred more
times more clothes than you can wear. You shall have a patent for taking away from others
the means of a happy and respectable existence, and for consuming them in riotous and
unmeaning extravagance.” Is this the reward that ought to be offered to virtue, or that
virtue should stoop to take?’. This attitude would seem to undermine Isaac Kramnick’s
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retributive punishment, arguing that ‘to punish’ an individual ‘for
what is past and irrecoverable and for the consideration of that only,
must be ranked among the most pernicious exhibitions of an untutored
barbarism’.63 His more general point in both discussions is that the
practice of ‘conferring rewards’ has a necessarily ‘pernicious effect’.64
This presents an obvious problem: if desert is a ‘pernicious’ foundation
upon which to ground questions of justice, why does Godwin invoke it
to defend his proposition that we are obliged (by justice) to disregard
affective relationships in order to preserve Fe´nelon?
A resolution to this problem lies in the nature of the ‘famous
fire cause’ itself. In contemporary debates, political philosophers
make much of the difference between ‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’
impartialist theories.65 First-order impartiality concerns the level of
individual actions whereas second-order impartiality focuses on the
rules or principles that ground a moral theory. The tendency in
contemporary discussions is to regard Godwin’s ‘famous fire cause’
as the epitome of first-order impartiality: the assumption is that he
expects us to act in an impartial manner at all times, under any
circumstances. In contrast, second-order impartialist moral theories
require no such demanding behaviour and are thought able, not merely
to accommodate but actually to endorse the affective relationships
that Godwin appears proud to shun. There are, however, reasons to
doubt whether Godwin’s argument actually indicates (as universally
supposed) a first-order impartialist theory rather than a second-order
alternative.
Godwin’s second-order credentials emerge once it is realized that
no impartialist theory accords ethical priority to affective relationships
under all circumstances. Brian Barry’s second-order impartialist theory
is a perfect example of this. Barry’s theory is explicitly addressed to
impartial moral principles rather than everyday impartial actions and
can thus accommodate affective relationships. Yet, Barry concedes that
in truly exceptional circumstances, any second-order impartialist theory
would . . . have to reach the same conclusion as Godwin about the right thing
to do in the ‘famous fire cause’. It is an unavoidable implication of any set
of moral norms that can be squared with second-order impartiality in any of
interpretation of Godwin as a proponent of meritocracy in Republicanism and Bourgeois
Radicalism (Ithaca, 1990).
63 Godwin, Political Justice, vol. 2, p. 327.
64 Ibid., p. 322.
65 For some discussions of ‘two-level’ impartialist moral theories, see Barry, Justice as
Impartiality, chs. 8–9; and Susan Mendus, Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy
(Oxford, 2002), ch. 2.
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its forms that people may be unlucky enough to find themselves in situations
where doing the right thing entails great sacrifice.66
Barry then offers alternative scenarios in which sacrifice is the right
thing to do – such as having your family kidnapped by terrorists and
being told they will be killed unless you plant a bomb certain to kill
thousands.67 In such circumstances, he suggests ‘the right thing to
do is refuse to plant the bomb’ in spite of the consequences faced by
one’s family.68 His point, then, is that sometimes, when the stakes are
high enough, even second-order impartialist theories will recommend
that affective ties be disregarded. In spite of this Barry maintains that
the ‘famous fire cause’ represents first-order impartiality and that,
for Godwin, there is nothing ‘to restrict the imperative to sacrifice
your parent’ to a particularly extreme case: ‘in principle, even a slight
advantage in total future utility’ would swing the outcome either way.69
But this crucial claim is suspect, since, for Godwin, Fe´nelon’s impending
death is a situation of extreme moral emergency.70
The argument that Fe´nelon’s life is of the utmost value may seem
eccentric, but the principle behind the argument is no different
from Barry’s. Indeed, in Political Justice Godwin acknowledges the
importance of ‘providing, in ordinary cases for my wife and children,
my brothers and relations, before I provide for strangers’.71 Crucially,
the circumstances under which this partiality rule must be abandoned
seem to be exactly the same as those supplied by Barry and other
second-order impartialists: that partiality must be disregarded in ‘cases
of a higher order’.72 The only disagreement, then, between Barry and
Godwin concerns the specifics of the case in question, the value of the
life of Fe´nelon, which only Godwin views as of tremendous utility to
society.73 There is no difference in principle between the two arguments.
66 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 223.
67 Ibid., pp. 223–4.
68 Ibid., p. 224. See also Barry, ‘Something in the Disputation not Unpleasant’,
Impartiality, Neutrality and Justice: Re-reading Brian Barry’s ‘Justice as Impartiality’,
ed. Paul Kelly (Edinburgh, 1998), pp. 248–55, for a restatement of his argument that
second-order impartiality sanctions sacrifice under some circumstances.
69 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 224.
70 Barry does acknowledge that Godwin offers a more sophisticated impartialist theory
than is usually supposed. However, he traces this to alleged changes in position outlined
in the ‘Reply to Parr’, maintaining that the ‘original view’ in Political Justice is first-
order impartialist (ibid., pp. 224–5). Thus Barry later restates the seemingly artificial
distinction between Godwin’s justification for preserving Fe´nelon and his own ‘terrorist’
alternative (‘Something in the Disputation’, p. 250).
71 Godwin, Political Justice, vol. 1, pp. 131–2.
72 Ibid.
73 Though Godwin did subsequently confess his regret for using Fe´nelon as his
example, it is on the grounds that he ‘did not take into mind the prejudices and habits of
men’, realizing later that ‘the benefit to accrue from the writing of books is too remote an
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The ‘famous fire cause’ is therefore better construed as indicating
Godwin’s commitment to a second-order impartialist theory than to
the first-order variant that is most often attributed to him.
This view of Godwin’s argument has clear relevance to the justi-
ficatory issues discussed earlier. If the rescue of Fe´nelon is a special
case and Godwin does not subscribe to the view that we should always
abandon our affective ties for marginal increases in utility, then there
is no necessary contradiction in his introduction of a justificatory
principle, which he rejects as a basis for general moral matters such as
punishment or the distribution of property. There is thus no necessary
conflict between Godwin’s invocation of Fe´nelon’s moral worth as a
reason for his rescue and the view that desert is a ‘pernicious’ moral
principle.
CONCLUSION
This article has taken a rather tortuous path to reach an equivocal
conclusion, one that stresses the ambiguities in Godwin’s utilitarian
case for the preservation of Fe´nelon at the expense of a loved one. It
is therefore probably useful to summarize the key points once more.
It began by noting that there are usually two types of justification
available for a utilitarian argument: egalitarian and teleological.
However, as the example of John Stuart Mill indicates, it is not always
easy to identify which principle ultimately does the justificatory work.
Turning to Godwin’s utilitarianism, I outlined the flaws in the common
teleological interpretation of his argument for impartiality, contained
in the ‘famous fire cause’.
However, whilst locating a Benthamite egalitarian basis in Godwin’s
conclusion seems initially plausible, this interpretation seems to ignore
key aspects of the argument. Close attention to the text reveals
that Godwin offers two reasons for preferring Fe´nelon. Moreover,
these reasons are not only superficially separate and part of the
same argument, but actually stem from distinct (indeed conflicting)
philosophical foundations. Though the second reason Godwin gives is
utilitarian (seemingly justified on egalitarian rather than teleological
grounds), the first appears to suggest that Fe´nelon should be rescued as
a reward for his being further removed from the state of an animal. The
significance of this argument becomes clear when Godwin’s writings on
the meaning of equality are considered. For Godwin, the recognition of
moral worth is defensible not only on the grounds that it is conducive
to the general good, but also because it is part of what it means to
idea, to strike and fill the imagination’ (‘Reply to Parr’, p. 331). He suggests that either
Brutus or Napoleon Bonaparte would have made more felicitous choices for his example.
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treat individuals as equals. In the same manner as it is wrong to
distribute love equally between oneself and one’s neighbour, it is wrong
to consider two people equally worthy of preservation in a situation of
tragic choice. Godwin is, then, offering two arguments for preserving
Fe´nelon, both of which stem from foundational commitments to
equality. Moreover, these are not only different conceptions of equality,
they are actually conflicting conceptions; and it is unclear which is
ultimately foundational.
When it comes to assessing Godwin’s argument for impartiality,
moral philosophers are quick to condemn the ‘absurdity’ of the
conclusion that he reaches.74 This is not particularly surprising. What
is surprising is the scant attention paid to the philosophical foundations
that justify and motivate this argument. If these foundations are as
ambiguous as they seem to be, there is clearly a case for further
investigation and grounds for taking Godwin seriously as one of the
most complex and sophisticated of the early utilitarian thinkers.75
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74 See, for example, Mendus, pp. 49–55.
75 I am very grateful to Lena Halldenius, Alan Ryan and Corinna Wagner for criticism
and to Dario Castiglione for valuable advice on this article. I owe a particular debt to
Iain Hampsher-Monk for comments on several earlier drafts as well as innumerable
discussions of Godwinian matters.
